Introduction
In a runo¤ election, the candidate with the greatest number of votes wins outright in the …rst round if she obtains more than a prede…ned fraction of the votes (called the threshold for …rst-round victory). If no candidate wins in the …rst round, then a second round is held between the two candidates with the most …rst-round votes. The winner of that round wins the election.
The runo¤ electoral system is the single most used electoral system for presidential elections: 61 out of 91 countries that directly elect a president have a runo¤ provision (Blais et al. 1997 ) -France being a notorious example. Moreover, its popularity has continued to rise over the past decades: about 70% of the presidential elections held in the 90s were runo¤ elections, compared to only 30% in the 60s (Golder 2005 ). The widespread use of the runo¤ system is also striking in the U.S.: runo¤ primaries are a trademark in southern states, and most large American cities have a runo¤ provision (Bullock III and Johnson 1992, Engstrom and Engstrom 2008 ). 1 The perceived rationale for the worldwide use of runo¤ systems is twofold: …rst, runo¤ elections are expected to be more conducive to preference and information revelation than plurality elections and, second, they are claimed to prevent the victory of minority candidates. 2 Yet, despite the relative ubiquity of runo¤ systems, our understanding of their properties and of voters'behavior is limited and mostly informal. The few formal models of runo¤ elections leave important features aside (Cox 1997 and Martinelli 2002) .
In this paper, I propose a new model of three-candidate runo¤ elections which challenges the conventional wisdom in several important ways.
My model includes two new features. First, voters perceived that all candidates participating in the second round have a positive (and endogenous) probability of winning.
This contrasts with previous models, which assumed no risk of upset victory in the second round. I obtain this feature by relaxing the constraint that the voters participating in the 1 Actually, the U.S. presidential electoral system is a runo¤ system: if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, the House of Representatives chooses the President among the top three contenders. 2 The latter rationale can be found in the literature in a slightly di¤erent form. In particular, it is often argued that runo¤ electoral systems should be used because they guarantee that the elected president has a mandate of a large part of the population. This is intented to legitimate her position once elected.
two rounds are necessarily the same (for empirical evidence that the two electorates do di¤er, see Wright 1989, Bullock III and Johnson 1992, Morton and Rietz 2006) . Second, my model allows for the analysis of many di¤erent types of runo¤ systems: any threshold for …rst round victory between 0% and 100%, as well as more sophisticated rules (moving thresholds and victory margin requirements). In practice, thresholds below 50% are far from exceptional. For instance, the threshold is 40% in Costa Rica, North Carolina
State and New York City. Some countries use sophisticated thresholds: in Argentina, for example, a candidate wins outright if she gains 45% of the votes or if she gains 40% of the votes as well as 10% more than the runner-up. 3 Three main results emerge. First, runo¤ elections produce multiple Duverger's Law equilibria -that is, equilibria in which only two candidates receive votes in the …rst round. In those, some voters abandon their most preferred candidate and vote to ensure the outright victory of a strong candidate. They do so to avoid the risk of an upset victory by a less-preferred candidate in the second round. In at least one Duverger's Law equilibrium, the Condorcet winner 4 does not receive any votes.
The second main result is that the sincere voting equilibrium -that is, the equilibrium in which all voters vote for their most preferred candidate in the …rst round -does not always exist. The reason is the same as the one explaining the existence of Duverger's Law equilibria. Together, these two …rst results prove that the Duverger's Law equilibria may be the only (pure strategy) equilibria in runo¤ elections.
The third main result is that runo¤ elections with a threshold below 50% may produce an equilibrium that allows the outright victory of the Condorcet loser in the …rst round. 5 This happens precisely because a sincere voting equilibrium exists for some distributions of voter preferences. The Condorcet loser could instead be beaten if a su¢ ciently large coalition of voters deviated and coordinated their votes on one of the trailing candidates.
This excessive vote dispersion happens because, conditional on being pivotal, voters overestimate the likelihood that a second round will be held. They thus vote for their preferred 3 Thresholds above 50% are more rare: the only case I am aware of is the 1996 presidential election in Sierra Leone, for which the threshold was de…ned at 55%. 4 The Condorcet winner is a candidate that would win a one to one contest against any other candidate. 5 The Condorcet loser is a candidate that would lose a one to one contest against any other candidate.
candidate to qualify her for the second round. I call this the Ortega e¤ect, after Daniel Ortega, the winner of the 2006 Presidential election in Nicaragua. By contrast, the Ortega e¤ect does not exist in plurality elections since there is no second round. Actually, in plurality elections, there is no (expectationally stable) equilibrium in which the Condorcet loser is the only likely winner (Fey 1997 and section 4.2.4 in this paper).
Together, these results form a twofold contradiction of the conventional wisdom regarding runo¤ systems. First, it is commonly believed that runo¤ elections are more conducive to preferences and information revelation than plurality (Duverger 1954 Law and Hypothesis, respectively: "the simple-majority single-ballot system [the plurality electoral system] favors the two-party systems" whereas the "simple majority with a second ballot [the runo¤ electoral system] favors multipartyism". His intuition is that the voters'incentives to abandon their most preferred candidate and rally behind a serious candidate are more powerful in plurality than in runo¤ elections. Indeed, there should only be two serious candidates in plurality elections (those who have a serious chance to tie for victory), whereas there should be three serious candidates for the second round.
The existence of Duverger's Law equilibria in runo¤ elections contradicts this belief and, therefore, Duverger's Hypothesis. 6;7 Second, the choice of a threshold level has traditionally been based on a perceived trade-o¤ between costs of organization and the risk of a minority candidate victory. Callander (2005) also shows that the introduction of a runo¤ system in a race with multiple candidates is unlikely to trigger a switch toward a two-candidate race. My results are complementary: …rst, I show that strategic candidates are not necessary for Duverger's Law equilibria to arise. Second, I show that strategic voters might trigger a switch toward a Duverger's Law outcome: with strategic voters, even if there are three candidates in the running, it is possible that only two of them receive votes. My results thus suggest that strategic voters are crucial to explain switches of multiparty systems into two-party systems. 7 Morton and Rietz (2006) mention the existence of Duverger's Law equilibria in runo¤ elections with 50%-threshold when voters are strategic. Yet, they do not identify the conditions of existence of the Duverger's Law equilibria, nor do they prove that the Duverger's Law equilibria may be the only pure strategy equilibria. 8 Many governments have indeed adopted runo¤ provisions in response to such a victory (see e.g. Bullock III and they are instrumental. The twelve types of voters allow for the representation of every possible preference ordering over the three candidates (except for global indi¤erence). I explicitly de…ne the preference ordering of three types of voters:
There is no confusion about the preferences of the other types.
A runo¤ election works as follows. In the …rst round ( = 1), each voter either casts a ballot in favor of one of the candidates or abstains. The action set of the voters is denoted by 1 = fA; B; C; ?g. If the candidate who ranks …rst obtains more than a pre-de…ned fraction, ; of the votes (called the threshold for …rst-round victory), she wins outright and there is no second round. 15 A second round is held if no candidate passes the 1 4 The results do not depend on the assumption of a Poisson distribution of voters. In particular, results hold if the size of the population is known and …xed. Proof available upon request. 1 5 In Section 6, I show that the results hold when …rst-round victory requires a victory margin over the secondranked candidate.
threshold for …rst-round victory. In the second round ( = 2), each voter either casts a ballot in favor of one of the participating candidates or abstains. In this round, however, not all candidates participate: only the two candidates who received the most votes in the …rst round (called the top-two candidates) are included. The action set of the voters is denoted by 2 = fP; Q; ?g, where P and Q refer to the candidates who ranked …rst and second in the …rst round, respectively. The candidate who obtains the most votes in this round wins the election. To lighten notation, I assume without loss of generality that ties are resolved by alphabetical order: A wins over both B and C, B wins over C.
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In a three-candidate setup, a runo¤ electoral system with a threshold below 1 3 is equivalent to the plurality electoral system (a.k.a. …rst-past-the-post). Since at least one candidate receives 1 3 or more of the votes, a second round is never held: the …rst round always determines a winner. Therefore, I only consider runo¤ electoral systems with a threshold 1 3 .
17
I conduct the analysis under the assumption that the size of the electorate, l, is distributed according to a Poisson distribution of mean n: l P (n) (see Appendix A1 for a summary of important properties of Poisson games). Each voter is assigned a type t by i.i.d. draws. The probability that a randomly drawn voter is assigned type t is r (t) ; with P t2T r (t) = 1: These probabilities are common knowledge. In runo¤ elections, voters participating in the …rst round may di¤er from those par- show, voter behavior is dramatically a¤ected by the precision of information regarding the distribution of preferences in the electorate, as conveyed by the …rst-round outcome. 1 6 Results hold if I assume that ties are resolved by the toss of a fair coin. 1 7 For details about voters behavior in multicandidate plurality elections, see Myerson and Weber (1993) and Fey (1997 Strategies for …rst round voters as well as for second round voters must be de…ned. In the …rst round, a type t's strategy is a mapping 1 : T ! fA; B; C; ?g that speci…es a probability distribution over the set of actions in round = 1. In the second round, a type t's strategy is a mapping 2 : T ffA; Bg ; fA; Cg ; fB; Cgg ! fA; B; C; ?g such that suppf 2 (t; fP; Qg)g = fP; Q; ?g ; which speci…es a probability distribution over the set of actions in round = 2 (it depends on which candidates are participating in the second round). For the sake of readability, I henceforth omit fP; Qg from the notation 2 (t; fP; Qg): Given the strategy , a fraction
of the electorate is expected to play action in round . I call ( ) the expected share of voters who choose action in round given the strategy .
The number of players who choose action in round is denoted by x ; where 2 : This number is random (voters do not observe it before going to the polls) and its distribution depends on the strategy, through ( ). The expected number of votes in favor of in round is therefore:
For the sake of readability, I henceforth omit from the notation.
Given the intrinsic properties of population uncertainty, the equilibrium mapping (t)
is identical for all voters of a same type t (see Myerson 1998 , p377, for more detail). 20 Therefore, for this voting game, I analyze the limiting properties of sequences of symmetric (weak) perfect Bayesian equilibria when the expected population size n becomes in…nitely large. 21 
Pivot Probabilities and Payo¤s in Runo¤ Elections
Since voters are instrumental, their behavior depends on the probability that a ballot a¤ects the …nal outcome of the elections, i.e. its probability of being pivotal. In runo¤ elections, a ballot may be pivotal in both rounds. This section identi…es all the pivotal events. Their probabilities are derived in Appendix A1 (which summarizes the properties of Poisson games and applies them to runo¤ elections). Then, I compute voters'expected payo¤s of the di¤erent actions in the two rounds. Both subsections start with the analysis of the second round.
Pivot Probabilities

Second Round
In a second round opposing P to Q; a ballot can change the outcome of the election in two ways: from a victory of P to a victory of Q; and vice versa. Suppose that P 2 fA; B; Cg ranks before Q 2 fA; B; Cg=P . A ballot is pivotal between P and Q in the second round if an additional ballot in favor of P allows her to win instead of Q: This event, denoted piv 2 P Q ; happens when P trails behind Q by exactly one vote: an additional ballot in favor of P leads to a tie between P and Q and thus to the victory of the former (since ties are broken alphabetically). Similarly, a ballot is pivotal between Q and P in the second round if an additional ballot in favor of Q allows her to win instead of P: This event, denoted piv 2 QP ; happens when P and Q obtain exactly the same number of votes: an additional 2 0 Indeed, types can always be rede…ned such that di¤erent types of voters have the same preferences. 2 1 This does not mean that the identi…ed properties of runo¤ elections only hold for in…nitely large electorates.
It means that there is always an n su¢ ciently large (but potentially small) such that runo¤ electoral systems feature the identi…ed properties. ballot in favor of Q breaks the tie with P and ensures the victory of Q.
First Round
The …rst round in ‡uences the …nal result either directly (if one candidate wins outright) or indirectly (through the identity of the candidates participating in the second round).
Due to the alphabetical order tie-breaking rule, the precise conditions for the pivotal events actually depend on the alphabetical order of the candidates. Yet, I de…ne the di¤erent pivotal events for any candidates i; j; k 2 fA; B; Cg and i 6 = j 6 = k; abstracting from the candidates'alphabetical order. These conditions are thus necessarily loose. 22 A ballot can a¤ect the outcome of the election directly in two ways. First, a ballot is threshold pivotal i=ij; denoted piv 1 i=ij ; if candidate i lacks one vote (or less) to pass the threshold for …rst-round victory and the other candidates are all below that threshold.
Thus, with one additional vote, i wins outright. Without an additional vote in favor of i; a second round opposing i to j is held. Symmetrically, the threshold pivotability ij=i, denoted piv 1 ij=i , refers to an event in which any ballot against candidate i, i.e. in favor of either j or k, prevents an outright victory of i in the …rst round and ensures that a second round opposing i to j is held.
Second, a ballot is above-threshold pivotal i=j, denoted piv 1 i=j , if candidates i and j have (almost) the same number of votes and are both above the threshold. An additional vote in favor of candidate i allows her to win outright in the …rst round, but, without any other ballot in favor of i; candidate j wins outright. Since two candidates cannot simultaneously obtain more than 50% of the votes, the above threshold pivotability is possible if and only if the threshold is below 50%.
A ballot may also a¤ect the …nal outcome if it changes the identity of the two candidates participating in the second round. This happens when a ballot changes the identity of the candidate who ranks third in the …rst round. A ballot is second-rank pivotal ki=kj when candidate k ranks …rst and candidates i and j tie for second place. An additional vote in favor of candidate i allows her, instead of j, to participate in the second round with k: Table 1 : …rst-round pivotal events.
Event Notation Condition
Threshold pivotal i=ij piv
Threshold pivotal ij=i piv
Above-threshold pivotal i=j piv 1 i=j
Second-rank pivotal ki=kj piv 1 ki=kj
Payo¤s
The value of each ballot, and thus voters'behavior, depends on its probability of being pivotal. In the …rst round, it also depends on voters'expectations about the outcome of the second round.
Second Round
Let G 2 ( jt) denote the expected gain of playing action 2 2 in the second round.
This gain depends on the voter's preference, summarized by U ( jt), and on the strategy functions of second-round voters, 2 : The strategies of other voters determine the expected number of votes received by each candidate in the second round, and thereby the pivot probabilities in that round. For a type t, the expected gain of voting for candidate P in the second round is:
This reads as follows: a ballot in favor of candidate P can be pivotal in favor of P against candidate Q: If this happens, then P is elected instead of Q and voter t's payo¤ is U (P jt) U (Qjt): By de…nition, G 2 (?jt) = 0 8t:
First Round
Let G 1 ( jt) denote the expected gain of playing action 2 1 in the …rst round. This gain depends on the voter's preference, summarized by U ( jt), and on the strategy functions of all voters: 1 and 2 : First-round strategies determine the expected number of votes received by each candidate in the …rst round, and thus the pivot probabilities in that round. Second-round strategies allow …rst-round voters to compute their expected utility for the di¤erent possible second rounds (A vs. B, A vs. C; and B vs. C). For a type t voter, the expected utility of a second round opposing i to j is given by
where Pr(ij fi; jg) is the probability that candidate i wins the second round if opposed to candidate j and Pr (jj fi; jg) = 1 Pr (ij fi; jg).
For a type t, the expected gain of playing action i in the …rst round is:
where i; j; k 2 fA; B; Cg and i 6 = j 6 = k. The …rst line in (4) reads as follows: if a ballot in favor of i is second-rank pivotal ki=kj; then the second round opposes k to i instead of k to j; if a ballot in favor of i is second-rank pivotal ji=jk; then the second round opposes j to i instead of j to k. The second line refers to the gains when the ballot is above-threshold pivotal and the three last lines refer to the gains when the ballot is threshold pivotal. For the sake of simplicity, I perform the equilibrium analysis under the simplifying assumption that the electorate is composed of only three types of voters: t AB ; t BA ; and Types t
00
CA are called the minority voters: in expected terms, they represent a minority of the electorate, i.e. r (t 00 CA ) < 1=2. They strictly prefer candidate C to the other candidates, about whom they are indi¤erent:
These voters always vote for C:
Together, types t AB and t BA are called the majority voters: in expected terms, they represent a majority of the electorate, i.e. r(t AB ) + r(t BA ) > 1=2: Types t AB and t BA all identify candidate C as being the worst option but have di¤ering opinions about A and B. Types t AB prefer A to B whereas types t BA prefer B to A:
In a previous version of the paper, I considered a di¤erent source of divisions among voters: voters were divided because of information instead of preferences. I proved that the main results hold under that assumption.
and
To be sure that the results do not hinge on any form of symmetry, I assume that, in expected terms, types t AB represent a larger (or equal) fraction of the electorate than types t BA : r(t AB ) r(t BA ): Note that the particular values of U (Ajt) ; U (Bjt) ; and U (Cjt) are not necessary for my results.
I start with the analysis of the second-round voting behavior.
Second Round
Being a two-candidate election, the analysis of voters' behavior in the second round is straightforward. From (3), it immediately follows that:
Proposition 1 In the second round, voters always vote for the candidate they prefer.
Thus, the expected results of the second round depends on the identity of the candidates participating in that round:
(i) when fP; Qg = fA; Cg or fC; Ag:
CA ); (ii) when fP; Qg = fB; Cg or fB; Cg: When C participates in the second round, majority voters coordinate their votes on the participating majority candidate. This ensures that the majority candidate, either A or B, defeats C with a probability that tends to 1 as n becomes large. When A and B are opposed, the result depends on the fractions of types t AB and t BA ; r (t AB ) and r (t BA ) ; as well as on type t 00 CA strategies, 2 (Ajt 00 CA ) and 2 (Bjt 00 CA ). For the sake of simplicity, I assume that types t 00 CA abstain if C does not participate in the second round, i.e.
2 (?jt 00 CA ) = 1 if fP; Qg = fA; Bg. Therefore, when opposed to B, except if r (t AB ) = r(t BA ); A wins with a probability that tends to 1 when n becomes large. I will make clear that this assumption is not central to my results.
First Round 4.2.1 Duverger' s Law Equilibria
The game theoretic version of Duverger's Law states that, in plurality elections, only two candidates should obtain a positive fraction of the votes when voters are strategic. The game theoretic version of Duverger's Hypothesis states that, in the …rst round of a runo¤ election, at least three candidates obtain a positive fraction of the votes. ; these equilibria exist for any r(t 00 CA ) 2 0; CA is not too small, the risk of a C victory (in either round) is too high in comparison with the likelihood of having A participating in the second round.
The speci…cities of the (su¢ cient) conditions on the size of the minority depend on the Poisson distribution of voters. Nevertheless, the trade-o¤ is self-explanatory. A majority voter has an incentive to abandon a trailing candidate (A in the above example) if the risk of C's victory is too high compared to the …rst-round chances of bringing the trailing majority candidate to the second round. Typically, the larger C's vote share, the higher the risk of C's victory, and the lower the probability that one vote may bring the trailing majority candidate to the second round. This makes clear that the risk of an upset victory is crucial for the Duverger's Law equilibria to exist when 2 (i) the sincere voting equilibrium exists if r(t AB ) r(t BA ) " 1 and r (t BA ) r (t AB ) < r (t 00 CA ) ;
(ii) the sincere voting equilibrium does not exist if both r (t BA ) < " 2 and the conditions for the existence of Duverger's Law equilibria are satis…ed.
The intuition for the existence of the sincere voting equilibrium is as follows: conditional on being pivotal, majority voters choose which majority candidate participates in the second round with C. The event piv 1 CA=CB is most likely when A and B are, in expectations, relatively close to tying for second place and C is expected not to pass the threshold. Since the probability of defeating C in the second round is the same for both majority candidates, majority voters vote for their most preferred candidate: t AB -voters vote A and t BA -voters vote B: As mentioned above, this part of Theorem 2 need not extend to a setup with more types of voters (see subsection 4.3 for details).
Conversely, Theorem 2 also identi…es when the sincere voting equilibrium cannot exist.
The intuition is that some majority voters vote for their second-best candidate to avoid the risk of an upset victory in either the …rst or the second round (i.e. they are either above-threshold pivotal against C or threshold pivotal in favor of a majority candidate).
This happens when one majority candidate has (much) more supporters than the other.
In such a case, conditional on being pivotal, the election essentially boils down to a contest between one of the majority candidates and C: Some majority voters then abandon their most preferred candidate in order to ensure an outright victory of the other majority candidate in the …rst round.
Theorem 2 can be illustrated through numerical examples. First, one can illustrate that sincere voting is an equilibrium when majority candidates have su¢ ciently balanced support. Suppose that = 0:5; r (t AB ) = 0:3, r (t BA ) = 0:26, and r(t 00 CA ) = 0:44: As shown in Table 2 , for these parameter values, majority voters assess that, conditional on being pivotal, they choose which majority candidate will oppose C in the second round. Indeed, mag(piv 1 CA=CB ) is the largest magnitude. 27 Hence, both types t AB and t BA vote for their most preferred candidate in order to force her participation in the second round. 
The next example illustrates that sincere voting is not an equilibrium when the majority is su¢ ciently unbalanced. Suppose that = 0:5; r (t AB ) = 0:38, r (t BA ) = 0:18, and r(t Table 3 that the sincere voting is not an equilibrium strategy. Indeed, mag(piv 1 A=AC ) + mag(Pr(CjfA; Cg) is larger than all other magnitudes. This means that majority voters realize that, conditional on being pivotal, casting an A-ballot would ensure an outright victory of A in the …rst round, whereas casting a B-or C-ballot would lead to an upset victory of C in the second round. Majority voters thus all prefer to vote for A. 2 7 The comparison between mag(piv 1 CA=CB ) and the threshold magnitudes should actually take into account the risk of an upset victory of C in the second round, i.e. mag(Pr(CjfA; Cg) and mag(Pr(CjfB; Cg). Since these magnitudes are smaller than 0; this actually reinforces the dominance of mag(piv 1 CA=CB ) over the threshold magnitudes. 
Theorem 2 is in stark contrast with previous results in the literature. Indeed, Cox 
The Ortega E¤ect
In this subsection, I prove that C; the Condorcet loser, may be the only likely winner in equilibrium when the threshold 2 . If C participates in the second round, majority voters coordinate behind the participating majority candidate (Proposition 1). 2 8 Cox (1997) does not argue against the existence of a Duverger's Hypothesis equilibrium, quite on the contrary. 2 9 Using numerical examples (available upon request), I can show that the relation between the threshold for …rst-round victory and the existence of the sincere voting equilibrium is "non-monotonic". That is, the existence of the sincere voting equilibrium for a threshold 1 does not guarantee that it exists for a higher threshold 2 : This is so because an outright victory of a majority candidate might be more likely for a higher value of the threshold.
Thus, r(t 00 CA ) < 1=2 implies that C cannot win the second round with a probability that tends to 1 as n becomes large. I thus focus on the possibility of an outright victory of C in the …rst round. In that round, C is the only likely winner if her expected vote share is above both the threshold and the expected vote shares of candidates A and B:
1 C > ; and (6)
From r (t 00 CA ) < 1=2; I have that
1 (Ajt AB ) > 0 and 1 (Bjt BA ) > 0: In equilibrium,
must then be satis…ed. From (4) and Property 2, a su¢ cient condition for (8) to be strictly satis…ed is: In such a situation:
To prove that C may be elected in equilibrium, it is therefore su¢ cient to prove that (9) can be true when (6) and (7) are satis…ed. Theorem 3 then follows:
Theorem 3 (Ortega e¤ect) For a threshold for …rst-round victory < 0:5, there are " 1 ; " 2 > 0 such that, if jr(t AB ) r(t BA )j " 1 and < r(t 00 CA ) < + " 2 ; there exists an equilibrium with the following two properties: Why would majority voters divide their votes when C is expected to win? Consider the …rst-round choice of a majority voter who prefers B to A: If he expects C to pass the threshold (which is below 50%) and then to win outright, his main objective is to prevent C's victory. There are two ways to achieve this goal: (i) vote for the strongest majority candidate, say A, to defeat C directly, or (ii) increase the threshold for …rst-round victory, which is achieved by voting for any of the two majority candidates (remember that the threshold is a percentage of the total number of votes). If a second round is then held, C is almost certainly defeated since all majority voters support the remaining majority candidate. The second option has the advantage that it does not require the majority voter to abandon B, his most preferred candidate, to …ght C. Actually, it allows him to hit two birds with one stone: preventing C outright victory and qualifying B for the second round.
The t BA -voter chooses option (i) and abandons B, his most preferred candidate, if the above-threshold pivotability A=C is su¢ ciently likely. He chooses option (ii) and votes for B if the threshold pivotability CA=C and the second-rank pivotability CB=CA are relatively more likely. Thus, even if C is expected to win, it may be individually rational for majority voters to vote for the candidate they prefer. This is what I call the Ortega e¤ect, which may allow the Condorcet Loser to be the only likely winner of a runo¤ election with a threshold below 50%. Roughly speaking, the Ortega e¤ect arises when C is unlikely to be defeated by a majority candidate in the …rst round, and the electorate is more or less evenly split among the two majority candidates. CA ) = 1 is an equilibrium strategy pro…le since, as illustrated in Table 2 , condition (9) is satis…ed: majority voters assess that, if they are pivotal, it is (i) to ensure that a second round is held (i.e. piv . Majority voters know that, conditional on being pivotal, a second round will be held. Therefore, types t AB vote for A to ensure her participation in the second round, and types t BA vote for B to ensure her participation in the second round. Although majority voters correctly anticipate an outright victory of C in the …rst round, they divide their votes between the two majority candidates. 
The existence of the Ortega e¤ect does not rely on any remaining uncertainty about the distribution of preferences in the electorate after the …rst round. On the contrary, it is reinforced if the risk of an upset victory by C is null. Preventing an outright victory of C in the …rst round by forcing a second round becomes more appealing if the majority candidate participating in the second round is sure to defeat C:
The Ortega e¤ect does not exist in plurality elections. Indeed, when C is expected to win, the majority voters'only way to defeat her is to vote for the strongest majority candidate: a ballot cannot be threshold pivotal CA=C since, by de…nition, there is no possibility of a second round in a plurality election.
Yet it has been argued that the Condorcet Loser can be the only likely winner in an equilibrium of a plurality election (Myerson and Weber 1993) . This happens if and only if both majority candidates are expected to get exactly the same vote shares. Majority voters then divide their votes because they do not know which candidate to coordinate on (this could also happen in a runo¤ election). However, Fey (1997) criticizes this equilibrium and shows that it is not expectationally stable (see next section for more details). 32 In contrast, I prove in the next subsection that the equilibria identi…ed in Theorems 1, 2, and 3, are all expectationally stable. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, the Condorcet
Loser is more likely to win in a runo¤ election with a threshold < 50% than in a plurality election.
Stability
Fey (1997) analyzes the stability of equilibria in plurality elections using a concept, developed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) , based on the dynamics of beliefs: Expectationally Stable Equilibrium. 33 They de…ne this stability concept for three-candidate plurality elections in which the preferences for the second best candidate are drawn uniformly on [0; 1].
I adapt their de…nition to the setup considered here:
De…nition 2 An equilibrium is expectationally stable if for any t 2 ft AB ; t BA g, there exists an " > 0 such that
If an equilibrium is expectationally stable, the following tâtonnement process con- As mentioned above, in plurality elections, the Duverger's Hypothesis equilibrium in which the Condorcet Loser is the only likely winner is not expectationally stable (Fey 1997 ). Given that a plurality election can be modelled as a runo¤ election with a threshold = 0; this result is easy to reproduce in the setup of this paper. 3 4 The concept of -adaptation of strategy is important for the intuition of the expectational stability of mixed strategy equilibria but is useless for pure strategy equilibria. If voters fully adapt their strategy, one iteration is su¢ cient for voters to play the equilibrium strategy in the latter case. By contrast, for mixed strategy equilibria, we would never observe convergence. If the preferences for the second best candidate were drawn uniformly on It remains to show that the equilibria in Theorems 1, 2, and 3, are expectationally stable. The proof relies on the continuity of the magnitudes in the expected vote shares.
For all the equilibria under consideration, one magnitude, say mag , is strictly larger than all the others. By the continuity of the magnitudes, there exist an " > 0 such that for These two previous paragraphs make clear that the equilibria in Theorems 1, 2, and 3 are all strictly perfect, i.e. a very stringent test of robustness due to Okada (1981) . 38 Indeed, by the continuity of the magnitudes in the expected vote shares, for any of these equilibria, the strategy is a best response to any element of a sequence of slightly trembled strategy pro…les k converging to the equilibrium :
At …rst sight, the stability and robustness of the Duverger's Law equilibrium in which the Condorcet winner receives no votes might be puzzling. Indeed, why would a majority of the voters not vote for their most preferred candidate? Arguably, this is a reasonable behavior when there is an incumbent majority candidate and she is not the Condorcet winner. In such a situation, each majority voter might expect the incumbent to receive the votes of most other majority voters. They therefore rightly believe that the incumbent is more likely than the other majority candidate (i.e. the Condorcet winner) to be in a close race with the minority candidate. Voting for the incumbent is then individually rational. 3 7 The expectational stability of Duverger's law equilibria also proves that these equilibria are robust to the presence of partisans voters in the electorate (i.e. voters that always vote for their most preferred candidate). 3 8 See e.g. Ghosh and Tripathi 2012 for application of this re…nement concept to voting games.
Coordination devices such as polls and parties may help majority voters to overcome such a coordination failure. Nonetheless, the existence of (expectationally stable) Duverger's
Law equilibria in runo¤ elections shows that the runo¤ system alone does not guarantee that such a coordination failure will never arise. Plurality elections feature the exact same weakness.
General setup
In this section, I show that, except for the …rst part of Theorem 2, the main results of the equilibrium analysis hold in the general setup with more than three types of voters.
The most striking feature of Theorem 1 is that there generally exists a Duverger's Law ; this equilibrium exists for any 2 0; Note that having a di¤erent electorate in each round is not necessary for the results to hold. Another su¢ cient condition is that voters discount the future a bit or perceive 3 9 For and su¢ ciently small, the ranking of magnitude is such that mag piv a cost to organizing a second round, or any other force that makes them prefer that a candidate wins in the …rst rather than in the second round.
When All Voters Participate in the Two Rounds
When the set of …rst-round voters is exactly the same as the set of second-round voters, the …nal outcome of the election is perfectly known, conditional on being pivotal in the …rst round. For instance, conditional on being threshold pivotal A=AC, the risk of an upset victory of C in the second round is null. Indeed, a ballot is threshold pivotal A=AC if
Therefore, voters know that, even if x The best response of a t BA voter, anticipating that all other majority voters are voting for A; is now to vote for B: He has nothing to gain by voting for A; whereas casting a B-ballot may allow B to participate to the second round with A (and then potentially win). Therefore, neither Theorem 1 nor the second part of Theorem 2 hold when the voters participating in the two rounds are exactly the same.
When Some Voters Participate in the Two Rounds
In practice, the group of …rst-round voters usually di¤ers from the group of secondround voters. There are two basic reasons for this: (i) some …rst-round voters do not participate in the second round, and (ii) some voters only participate in the second round. Applying Bayes'rule, I have that:
Considering the Duverger's Law equilibrium in which all majority voters vote for A;
I am interested in the probability of an upset victory of C conditional on a ballot being threshold pivotal A=AC in the …rst round. This conditional probability is Pr(Cj fA; Cg ; piv
where
and n 2 r 2 (t 00 CA ) respectively. Since
I am now in a position to prove that 1 (Ajt AB ) = 1 = 1 (Ajt BA ) (and 1 (Cjt 00 CA ) = 1)
4 0 The proof is available upon request.
is an equilibrium in runo¤ elections with a threshold 2 [ Since all (other) majority voters vote A and all minority voters vote C; I have from Lemma 2 that mag Pr(Cj fA; Cg ; piv
Knowing from (10) that r 2 (t AB ) = ; r 2 (t BA ) = ). This reduces the risk of an upset victory. On the other hand, if the threshold for …rst-round victory is lower than the expected size of the majority, then, conditional on being pivotal; voters realize that the majority is smaller than expected: if 1 r
. This increases the risk of upset victory. The conditions under which Duverger's Law equilibria exist may thus be more demanding. Nonetheless, as long as mag Pr(Cj fA; Cg ; piv 1 A=AC ) is su¢ ciently large, the Duverger's Law equilibria will exist.
Since the second part of Theorem 2 is closely related to the existence of Duverger's Law equilibria, I can prove in a similar fashion that it holds when the assumption of a complete new draw of voters is relaxed. ); the probability of an upset victory of C in the second round does not in ‡uence the behavior of majority voters: they are in ‡uenced by an above-threshold pivotability against C:
Victory Margin Requirements
In this section, I analyze runo¤ electoral systems that impose an extra condition for …rst-round victory: a victory margin requirement. In these electoral systems, a candidate wins outright in the …rst round if she receives more than a fraction of the votes and if she has a -points lead over the nearest competitor. I prove that my results hold.
Imposing a victory margin requirement has two consequences for pivot probabilities.
First, there is an additional condition for a ballot to be threshold pivotal and abovethreshold pivotal. For instance, without a victory margin requirement, a ballot is threshold pivotal i=ij if candidate i lacks (about) one vote to pass the threshold for …rst-round victory and if the ranking is i then j then k, i.e. if x
Now, in addition to these conditions, candidate i must have a lead over the other candidates larger than a fraction of the votes, i.e.
Since the magnitude of a threshold pivot probability and an above threshold pivot probability can only be a¤ected negatively by this new constraint, it is clear that mag(piv where the superscript V M refers to a runo¤ election with a victory margin requirement.
For instance, mag(piv 1;V M i=ij ) denotes the threshold-pivot probability i=ij when a victory margin is required.
The second consequence is that there is a new pivotal event in the …rst round. In runo¤ electoral systems with victory margin requirements, a ballot can allow a candidate to win outright in the …rst round if she has enough votes to pass the threshold but lacks one vote to have the -points lead over her nearest competitor, i.e. if x
In such a situation, I say that a ballot is margin pivotal i j; denoted piv 
The trade-o¤ underlying the existence of Duverger's Law equilibria (and the nonexistence of the sincere voting equilibrium) is the same as before: majority voters vote for the strong majority candidate in order to avoid the risk of an upset victory of C in the second round. The di¤erence is that majority voters may now have to ensure that the stronger majority candidate obtains a large enough margin of victory. This new requirement can in ‡uence majority voter incentives in two ways. On the one hand, this requirement may strengthen the incentives of majority voters to coordinate. Indeed, it may be more likely that the strong majority candidate falls short of one vote to pass the margin of victory than she falls short of one vote to rank above C (i.e. mag(piv
On the other hand, if the victory margin requirement is so demanding that it is almost impossible to satisfy, i.e. is too high, then the new requirement weakens the incentives of majority voters to coordinate. Majority voters prefer not to coordinate if it is unlikely that the strong majority candidate will win outright. 43 The extension of the second part of Theorem 2 to runo¤ elections with victory margin requirements follows directly from this argument.
The reason explaining the Ortega e¤ect is also the same as without a victory margin requirement: majority voters divide their votes in the …rst round because they realize that, if C does not win outright in the …rst round, this is because a second round is held (and not because one majority candidate defeats her directly). Nonetheless, by de…nition the victory margin requirement imposes an additional constraint for an outright victory of C in the …rst round:
This new constraint restricts the set of parameters for which the Ortega e¤ect exist: r(t 00 CA ) r(t AB ) > has to be satis…ed. this is true no matter the intensity of their preferences. 45 In the equilibrium sustaining the Ortega e¤ect, all majority voters vote for the candidate they prefer. Preferring a candidate more intensely cannot a¤ect such strategies nor the outcome they imply. Second, there are "only" three candidates. With respect to voters'behavior and the number of serious candidates in equilibrium, i.e. candidates receiving a positive fraction of votes, this assumption should be innocuous. Indeed, voters'strategic incentives imply that there are at most three serious candidates in runo¤ elections: the candidate expected to rank fourth would be abandoned by her supporters given that she could not qualify for the second round. 46 My model can thus be seen as a "reduced form" of a model with more candidates. Nonetheless, by doing so I exclude the possibility of analyzing how the three 4 5 In a setup with heterogenous preferences, Bouton and Gratton (2012) prove the existence of Duverger's law equilibria in runo¤ elections with a threshold at 50%. 4 6 This is not totally accurate: four candidates may receive a positive fraction of votes if three of them tie for the second rank (see Cox 1997) .
serious candidate are selected out of a larger set of candidates. This selection certainly su¤ers from coordination problems that might lead to ine¢ cient outcomes. This is an interesting avenue for future research.
[33] Riker, William (1982 
Appendices
Appendix A1 provides a reminder of some fundamental properties of Poisson games (Myerson 2000 and . Appendix A2 demonstrates the claims made in Section 4 .
Appendix A1: Large Poisson Games in Runo¤ Elections
In a Poisson game, population size follows a Poisson distribution of mean n. Since types are attributed by i.i.d. draws, the number of voters of each type also follows a Poisson distribution of mean n r (t), and, as shown by Myerson (2000) , the number of -votes in round follows a Poisson distribution of mean n :
The action pro…le of a group of players is the vector that lists, for each action ; the number of players 14) ; the probability that the action pro…le is x is:
An event E in round is a set of action pro…les that satisfy given constraints, i.e. it is a subset of Property 1 For a large population of size n; the probability of an event E is such that
That is, the probability that event E occurs is exponentially decreasing in n: mag (E ) 2 [ 1; 0] is called the magnitude of event E . Its absolute value represents the "speed" at which the probability decreases towards 0: the more negative is the magnitude, the faster the probability goes to 0.
Myerson (2000, Corollary 1) shows that:
Property 2 Compare two events with di¤ erent magnitudes: mag (E ) < mag (E 0 ). Then, the probability ratio of the former over the latter event goes to zero as n increases:
Together, Properties 1 and 2 have been called the magnitude theorem by Myerson (2000) . The intuition is that the probabilities of di¤erent events do not converge towards zero at the same speed.
Hence, unless two events have the same magnitude, their likelihood ratio converges either to zero or to in…nity when the electorate grows large. 47 Proofs in this paper rely extensively on these two properties.
Using Property 1 (and Theorem 2, Myerson 2000 48 ), I can prove the two following Lemma.
Lemma 2
The magnitudes of the second-round pivot probabilities P Q and QP are:
Proof. As detailed in Property 1, the magnitude of the event that candidates P and Q have exactly the same number of vote is:
If we denote x P = x Q = x; we …nd that this is maximized in x = n q 2 P 2 Q : Substituting for x in (16) thus yields:
The event that candidates P and Q have exactly the same number of vote is the pivotability QP , i.e. piv 2 QP : The event that candidate P trails behind candidate Q by exactly one vote is the pivotability P Q; 4 7 These properties are quite general and not speci…c to the Poisson distribution. This is the reason why most of the results extend directly to the multinomial distribution. 4 
Lemma 2 reformulates a known result for two-candidate elections (as is the second round): the larger the di¤erence in the expected vote shares of the two candidates, the smaller the magnitude of the pivot probability. The intuition is straightforward: for a ballot to be pivotal, candidates have to receive (almost) the same number of votes. This is more likely to happen if the second round is expected to be close.
Lemma 3
The magnitudes of the …rst-round pivot probabilities are:
(a) Threshold pivot probability i=ij and ij=i:
(b) Above-threshold pivot probability i=j and j=i (for < 1=2):
(c) Second-rank pivot probability ki=kj and kj=ki:
Proof. There are three types of magnitudes to compute. I only present the details for the magnitude of the threshold pivot probabilities i=ij and ij=i: The other cases are derived in a similar fashion (and available upon request).
A ballot is threshold pivotal i=ij when 
s:t:
; and if I abstract from the second constraint in (21) (or if it is not binding); I …nd that this is maximized in
Substituting for x 1 i=ij and i=ij in (20) yields what I call the unconstrained magnitude (denoted by the superscript ):
The magnitude of the threshold pivot probability i=ij is unconstrained if
From ( and then there are two other possible cases: (i)
In case (i), the constraint x 1 i x 1 j is binding: I thus bind the constraint, i.e. set i=ij = (1 ) ; and maximize the same problem as in (20) . This yields:
In case (ii), the constraint x 1 j x 1 k is binding. I thus bind the constraint, i.e. set i=ij = 1=2; and maximize the same problem as in (20) . This yields:
I have then proven that mag(piv A su¢ cient condition for the Duverger's Law equilibrium
1 and (24)
(i) Duverger' s Law equilibria when 2 
is the only magnitude that can be larger than 1. Therefore, I have that (24) and (25) are both satis…ed. This is true for any 0 < r(t 00 CA ) < 1=2. (ii) Duverger' s Law equilibria when = 
0:
If the second round opposes A to C, and A wins that round, then being …rst-round pivotal has no value. This is why being …rst-round pivotal is only valuable with probability Pr (Cj fA; Cg).
Since the magnitude of all pivot probabilities other than piv 
is the only magnitude that can be larger than 1. 50 Recall that a ballot cannot be above the threshold pivotal when There are then two cases to consider: (i) 2 p (1 r(t 00 CA )) r(t 00 CA ) < 1 r(t 
Knowing that if r(t 00 CA ) > 0:06699, then 2 p (1 r(t 00 CA )) r(t 00 CA ) > and 2 p (1 r(t 00 CA )) r(t 00 CA ) are larger than (4) and Property 2, mag(piv 1 CA=CB ) = 0 thus implies that there is an n su¢ ciently large such that
CA -voters always vote for C in the …rst round, we have that 1 (Ajt AB ) = 1 (Bjt BA ) = 1 (Cjt 00 CA ) = 1 is an equilibrium. From the continuity of the magnitudes in the expected vote shares, I have that the sincere voting equilibrium is not nongeneric, i.e. 9" 1 ; " 3 > 0 such that 8r (t AB ) 2 (r (t BA ) " 1 ; r (t BA ) + " 1 ) and r (t Remind that a ballot cannot be above-threshold pivotal when 1 2 . Third, when voters are sincere (i.e.
1 (Ajt AB ) = 1 (Bjt BA ) = 1 (Cjt 00 CA ) = 1), this pro…le of arises if r (t BA ) = 0 and r (t 00 CA ) 2 (0; 1=2). Therefore, by the continuity of the magnitudes in the expected vote shares, we know that there is " 2 > 0 such that if r (t BA ) = " 2 and r (t AB ) = 1 r (t 00 CA ) " 2 ; then mag piv 1 A=AC is still the largest magnitude (and arbitrarily close to p 1 r(t 00 CA ) p r(t 00 CA ) 2 ).
We can thus apply the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1 to show that a su¢ cient condition for (24) and (25) to be satis…ed is q 1 r(t 00 CA ) q r(t 00 CA ) < p 1=2;
or: r(t 00 CA ) > 0:06699. This proves that the sincere voting does not exist if both r (t BA ) < " 2 and the conditions for the existence of Duverger's Law equilibria are satis…ed.
Proof of Theorem 3.
First, I show that mag(piv < . Third, I show that there always exist " 1 ; " 2 > 0 such that, if r(t AB ) r(t BA ) < " 1 and < C < + " 2 then 1 (Ajt AB ) = 1 (Bjt BA ) = 1 (Cjt 00 CA ) = 1 is an equilibrium. C , there always exist " 1 ; " 2 > 0 such that, if r(t AB ) r(t BA ) < " 1 and < C < + " 2 then 1 (Ajt AB ) = 1 (Bjt BA ) = 1 (Cjt 00 CA ) = 1 are equilibrium strategies for which C wins outright in the …rst round with a probability that tends to 1 as n ! 1. and that C is the least popular candidate among A and C: r (t AB ) + r (t AC ) + r (t BA ) + r (t are the only magnitudes that can be larger than 1.
From (4) ; a su¢ cient condition for this strategy pro…le to be an equilibrium is that mag(piv 1 (r (t BC ) + r (t CA ) + r (t CB ) + r (t 0 BC ) + r (t 00 CA )) q r (t BC ) + r (t CA ) + r (t CB ) + r (t 0 BC ) + r (t 00 CA )< p
1=2:
This boils down to: r (t BC ) + r (t CA ) + r (t CB ) + r (t 
